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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
In these consolidated cases, Shawn M. Kesling appeals from the district court's
order revoking probation in Docket No. 39486, and denying his requests for credit for
time served in Docket Nos. 39484 and 39485.

Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings
In 2003, pursuant to plea agreements, Kesling pied guilty to one felony count in
each of three criminal cases as follows: 1 Docket No. 39484 -- forgery; Docket No.
39485 - grand theft by deception; Docket No. 39486 -- issuing a check without sufficient
funds.

(R., pp.45-51, 212-214, 399-401.)

On November 24, 2003, the district court

sentenced Kesling to concurrent unified nine-year sentences with two years fixed, all
suspended, and placed him on probation for nine years in each case. (R., pp.61-67,
228-234, 418-424.) On December 6, 2004, Kesling's probation officer "issued a travel
permit to allow Mr. Kesling to move to Florida to live with his father and mother" (R.,
p.431), and his probation was transferred to Florida through an Interstate Compact
agreement (PSI, p.16).
While living in Florida, Kesling was convicted of five Florida felonies.
pp.130-131.)

(PSI,

In response, on March 26, 2008, Idaho authorities filed a Motion for

Bench Warrant for Probation Violation against Kesling based on four of his five Florida
convictions. (R., pp.90-92, 251-253, 447-449.) Four days later, the district court filed a

1

The remaining counts in each case were dismissed pursuant to the plea agreements.

1

Bench Warrant for Probation Violation.

(R., pp.95-96, 256-257, 452-453.)

On his

Florida convictions, Kesling was ordered to serve five concurrent sentences of 45
months, which sentences were imposed on March 4, 2008, and he was released from
prison on March 23, 2011. (PSI, pp.130-132.) The Florida Department of Corrections'
Inmate Record reflects that from March 4, 2008, until March 2, 2011, Kesling's record
had an entry of "NOTIFY" under the heading "INMATE DETAINERS AS OF 09/30/11"
and statement that "THE FOLLOWING REFLECTS DETAINERS AGAINST THIS
RECORD, AND/OR REQUESTS TO BE NOTIFIED PRIOR TO RELEASE OF THE
INMATE."

(PSI, p.131; see R., p.141

("NOTIFY" entry dated 03/04/2008 on

"Corrections Offender Network" re: Kesling).)

On March 2, 2011, the entry was

changed to "DETAIN." 2 (PSI, p.131.)
After his release from prison in Florida, Kesling was transported to Idaho, where,
on March 29, 2011, he was served bench warrants for violating probation in his three
cases.

(R., pp.95-96, 256-257, 452-453.)

The state filed an Amended Motion for

Probation Violation, alleging all five Florida convictions as bases for finding Kesling in
violation of his probations. (R., pp.120-122, 282-284, 478-480. 3 ) On August 18, 2011,

2

As Kesling states, "[t]he record on appeal does not indicate (or include) the specific
document(s) received by Florida from Idaho which apparently asked Florida officials to
'notify' Idaho officials when Mr. Kesling was due to be released, nor does the record
contain the document(s) which served to 'detain' Mr. Kesling on the three Ada County
cases after his release on the Florida charges." (Appellant's Brief, p.9 n.10.)
3

In Docket No. 39486, the state alleged two additional probation violations, but they
were dismissed upon Kesling's admissions to the first five allegations. (R., pp.478-480,
484-485.)

2

Kesling admitted violating probation by having been convicted in Florida of five felony
offenses. (R., pp.125-126, 291-292, 484-485.)

Prior to the disposition hearing, Kesling, through counsel, filed a Motion for
Additional Credit Time [sic] Served, requesting 1, 121 more days of credit for time
served "from the date the Probation and Parole detainer was lodged until the date that
the Bench Warrant was officially served."4 (R., pp.132-133, 298-299, 491-492.) In his
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Additional Credit Time [sic] Served, Kesling
argued that he should be given credit for serving 1, 121 days in prison in Florida from
March 4, 2008, to March 29, 2011, when he was finally served Idaho's bench warrants,
explaining:

On March 4, 2008 a Probation and Parole detainer was lodged
(See Attachment A, Florida Department of
against Mr. Kesling.
Corrections, Corrections Offender Network Printout).
(R., pp.136, 302, 495 (emphasis added).)

Mr. Kesling asserts that as the reason for the probation violation
was the exact same reason he was under Florida Department of
Corrections custody he is entitled to the credit from the lodging of the
detainer until Mr. Kesling was officially served the bench warrant. . ..
The Detainer [sic] lodged by Probation and Parole acted as an
Agent's Warrant and Mr. Kesling should be entitled to an additional One
Thousand One Hundred and Twenty One (1121) days of credit time [sic]
served.
(R., pp.138, 304, 497 (emphasis added).)
4

According to the Date Time Calculator (www.timeandate.com), 1, 120 days elapsed
from March 4, 2008, to (but not including) March 29, 2011.

3

At the second probation violation disposition hearing, Kesling, through counsel,
argued that the March 4, 2008 "NOTIFY" entry on his Florida Inmate Record, which he
described as a "detainer," was the functional equivalent of a bench warrant, and,
therefore, he was entitled to post-judgment credit for time served from that date
forward. 5 (12/8/11 Tr., p.11, L.18 - p.21, L.10.)

After reviewing the legal basis for

Kesling's claim following the first disposition hearing (see n.5), the prosecutor concluded
Kesling should be given post-judgment credit for time spent in custody only after March
29, 2011, when Kesling was actually served with the Idaho bench warrants. (12/8/11
Tr., p.11, Ls.8-13.)

At the end of the second disposition hearing, the district court

ordered Kesling's probations revoked and imposed his original sentences. (R., pp.151153, 317-319, 510-512.)

The court gave Kesling post-judgment credit commencing

March 22, 2011 - the day Kesling said he was released from the Florida Department of
Corrections' custody, which was seven days before he was served with the three bench
warrants from Idaho. (Id; 12/8/11 Tr., p.19, L.22-p.20, L.5; PSI, pp.130-131.) Kesling
timely appealed from the district court's orders revoking probation and entering
judgments of conviction in his three cases. (R., pp.154-159, 320-325, 513-518.)

5

On April 24, 2013, the Idaho Supreme Court granted Kesling's motion to augment the
record with a transcript of the first (i.e., November 3, 2011) probation violation
disposition hearing, ordering the District Court Reporter to prepare and lodge the
transcript within 28 days. However, a transcribed copy of that hearing was attached to
Kesling's April 2, 2013 augmentation motion. At that hearing, Kesling's counsel argued
that Kesling should be credited for time served from March 4, 2008 forward. (See
generally 11/3/11 Tr.) The district court fluctuated between accepting Kesling's
argument, noting that the state presented no contrary argument, and rejecting Kesling's
argument. (Id.) At the close of the hearing, the court continued the matter so the state
could review the legal basis of Kesling's claim. (11/3/11 Tr., p.35, L.22 - p.36, L.13.)

4

In Docket No. 39486, Kesling filed a Rule 35 motion to correct an illegal
sentence, contending that his nine year sentence was illegal because the crime of
issuing a check without sufficient funds, l.C. § 18-3106(a), carries a maximum penalty of
three years, and suggested his sentence be modified to three years with two years
fixed. (R., pp.529-532.) After the state filed a notice of non-objection to Kesling's Rule
35 motion (R., pp.538-539), the district court granted Kesling's motion and reduced his
sentence as requested (R., pp.544-546).

5

ISSUES
Kesling states the issues on appeal as:
1.
Did the district court have jurisdiction to revoke Mr. Kesling's
probation in 39486?
2.
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Kesling's motion for
credit for time served?
(Appellant's Brief, p.6.)
The State rephrases the issues as:
1. Should this Court vacate the district court's probation revocation order in Docket No.
39486 because it lost jurisdiction, under l.C. § 19-2601 (7), after Kesling had been on
probation for a period more than the maximum period for which he might have been
imprisoned?
2. Has Kesling waived his "credit for time served" argument on appeal because he
failed to raise the same argument below, and even if considered under fundamental
error or otherwise, has he failed to establish he is entitled to an additional 20 days credit
for time served?

6

ARGUMENT

I.
This Court Should Vacate The District Court's Probation Revocation Order In Docket
No. 39486 Because It Lost Jurisdiction, Under l.C. § 19-2601 (7), After Kesling Had
Been On Probation For A Period More Than The Maximum Period For Which He Might
Have Been Imprisoned
The district court entered an Order Revoking Probation, Judgment of Conviction,
and Order of Commitment on December 13, 2011, in Docket No. 39484, in regard to
Kesling's conviction for issuing a check without sufficient funds.

(R., pp.510-512.)

Because the district court no longer had jurisdiction over Kesling in that case, its
revocation order was invalid and should be vacated.
The maximum penalty for the crime of issuing a check without sufficient funds is
three years. l.C. § 18-3106(a). According to l.C. § 19-2601 (7), a probationary period
may not be longer than the maximum period a defendant might have been imprisoned;
it states:
The period of probation ordered by a court under this section under
a conviction or plea of guilty for a misdemeanor, indictable or otherwise,
may be for a period of not more than two (2) years; and under a conviction
or plea of guilty for a felony the period of probation may be for a period of
not more than the maximum period for which the defendant might have
been imprisoned.
(Emphasis added. 6 )
Kesling was placed on probation on November 25, 2003. (R., pp.418-424.) His
maximum period of probation expired on November 25, 2006. Idaho authorities did not
file a Motion for Bench Warrant for Probation Violation against Kesling based on his
6

l.C. § 19-2601(7) was amended in 2012, but the highlighted part was modified to the
extent necessary to make it an independent sentence (i.e., "Under a conviction ... ").

7

Florida convictions until March 26, 2008 (R., pp.447-449), and the district court filed a
Bench Warrant for Probation Violation two days later (R., pp.452-453). Therefore, the
district court lacked jurisdiction in 2011 when it ordered Kesling's probation revoked.
See State v. Gamino, 148 Idaho 827, 832, 230 P.3d 437, 442 (Ct. App. 2010)
("Because the State's effort to revoke Gamino's probation was not timely commenced
by filing with the district court during the term of Gamino's probation, the district court's
order denying Gamino's motion to dismiss the probation violation proceedings and the
order extending Gamine's probation are reversed.")
Based on the above analysis, and the argument presented in Kesling's
Appellant's Brief, pp.7-9, the state does not dispute Kesling's contention that the distric;t
court lacked jurisdiction in 2011 to revoke his probation in Docket No. 39486.
Therefore, the state requests that the district court's November 25, 2011 order revoking
Kesling's probation be vacated.

11.
Kesling Has Waived His "Credit For Time Served" Issue On Appeal By Failing To Raise
It Below. And Even If Considered Under Fundamental Error Or Otherwise. He Has
Failed To Establish He Is Entitled To An Additional 20 Days Credit For Time Served
A.

Introduction
Kesling argues for the first time on appeal that because an entry on his Florida

Department of Corrections' Inmate Record (hereinafter "Florida Inmate Record")
regarding detainers was changed from "NOTIFY" to "DETAIN" on March 2, 2011, he
should have been given credit for time served between that day and March 22, 2011,
when he was released on his Florida sentences. (Appellant's Brief, pp.9-19.)

8

However, because Kesling did not raise that issue in the district court he has
waived it on appeal and this Court is precluded from reviewing it.

Further, even if

Kesling's issue is considered as a claim of fundamental error or otherwise, he has failed
to show, under l.C. § 18-309, 7 that his incarceration in a Florida prison from March 2,
2011, until March 22, 2011, was also "for the offense[s] ... for which the [Idaho]
judgment[s] [were] entered." Therefore, Kesling is not entitled to credit for any time
served during that 20-day period.

B.

Standards Of Review
'"A question of jurisdiction is fundamental; it cannot be ignored when brought to

[the appellate court's] attention and should be addressed prior to considering the merits
of an appeal."' State v. Kavajecz, 139 Idaho 482, 483, 80 P.3d 1083, 1084 (2003)
(quoting H & V Engineering. Inc. v. Idaho State Bd. of Professional Engineers and Land
Surveyors, 113 Idaho 646, 648, 747 P.2d 55, 57 (1987)).

Whether a court has

jurisdiction is a question of law, given free review. Kavajecz, 139 Idaho at 483, 80 P.3d
at 1084.

7

I. C. § 18-309 states:

Computation of term of imprisonment. - In computing the term
of imprisonment, the person against whom the judgment was entered,
shall receive credit in the judgment for any period of incarceration prior to
entry of judgment, if such incarceration was for the offense or an included
offense for which the judgment was entered. The remainder of the term
commences upon the pronouncement of sentence and if thereafter, during
such term, the defendant by any legal means is temporarily released from
such imprisonment and subsequently returned thereto, the time during
which he was at large must not be computed as part of such term.

9

"The question of whether a sentencing court has properly awarded credit for time
served to the facts of a particular case is a question of law, which is subject to free
review by the appellate courts." State v. Vasquez, 142 Idaho 67, 68, 122 P.3d 1167,
1168 (Ct. App. 2005) (citing State v. Hale, 116 Idaho 763, 779 P.2d 438 (Ct. App.
1989)). The construction and application of a statute also presents a question of law
over which the appellate court exercises free review. State v. Robinson, 143 Idaho 306,
307, 142 P.3d 729, 730 (2006); State v. Schwartz, 139 Idaho 360, 362, 79 P.3d 719,
721 (2003).
"It is a fundamental tenet of appellate law that a proper and timely objection must
be made in the trial court before an issue is preserved for appeal." State v. Carlson,
134 Idaho 389, 398, 3 P.3d 67, 76 (Ct. App. 2000). Whether the issue was preserved is
a "threshold" inquiry. State v. Stevens, 115 Idaho 457, 459, 767 P.2d 832, 834 (Ct.
App. 1989). If an issue has not been preserved, this Court must decline to address it
absent a showing of fundamental error. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 226, 245 P.3d
961, 978 (2010).

C.

Kesling Has Waived His Issue On Appeal By Failing To Present It To The District
Court
This Court is precluded from considering Kesling's "credit for time served" issue

because he failed to present it to the district court. It is well-settled that the failure to
raise an issue before the trial court generally waives that issue for purposes of appeal.
State v. McAway 127 Idaho 54, 60, 896 P.2d 962, 968 (1995); State v. Beard, 135
Idaho 641, 645-46, 22 P.3d 116, 120-21 (Ct. App. 2001). "An issue is different if it is not

10

substantially the same or does not sufficiently overlap with an issue raised before the
trial court." State v. Voss, 152 Idaho 148, 150, 267 P.3d 735, 737 (Ct. App. 2011)
(citing State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 277-278, 77 P.3d 956, 966-967 (2003)).
Kesling presented a different issue to the district court than the issue he raises on
appeal.
In the district court, Kesling argued at the disposition hearing and in his
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Additional Credit Time [sic] Served that the
March 4, 2008 "NOTIFY" entry on his Florida Inmate Record commenced the time
period for which he was entitled to credit, ending March 29, 2011, when he was served
with the Idaho bench warrants - for a total of 1,121 days. (R., pp.132-133, 135-139,
301-305; 12/8/11 Tr., p.11, L.18-p.21, L.10; see R., pp.132-133, 298-299 (Motion for
Additional Credit Time [sic] Served, requesting 1, 121 days additional credit).) However,
on appeal, Kesling presents an entirely different argument; he claims that the "DETAIN"
entry made on his Florida Inmate Record on March 2, 2011, proves that the district
court should have credited him for the ensuing twenty days served in a Florida prison,
until he was released on his Florida sentences on March 22, 2011. 8 (Appellant's Brief,
pp.9-19; see 12/8/11 Tr., p.19, Ls.22-24; PSI, pp.130-131.)
Because Kesling's "credit-for-time-served" motion and argument in the district
court requested 1, 121 days additional credit based on a Florida Inmate Record entry

8

Kesling acknowledges that the district court gave him credit for the seven-day period
between March 22, 2011 (when he said he was released from a Florida prison) and
March 29, 2011, when he was served the Idaho bench warrants after being transported
to Idaho. (Appellant's Brief, p.19.)

11

made on March 4, 2008, and his appellate argument seeks 20 days of credit based on
an entry made on March 2, 2011, Kesling presents a different issue on appeal than he
did in the district court. Therefore, Kesling has waived his "credit-for-time-served" issue
by failing to present the same issue below, and this Court is precluded from reviewing
that issue on appeal absent a showing of fundamental error. McAway 127 Idaho at 60,
896 P.2d at 968; Beard, 135 Idaho at 645-646, 22 P.3d at 120-121; Perry, 150 Idaho at
226, 245 P.3d at 978. 9

D.

Even If Kesling's Issue Is Considered, Under Fundamental Error Or Otherwise,
He Has Failed To Establish He Is Entitled To An Additional 20 Days Credit For
Time Served
Even if Kesling's "credit-for-time-served" issue is considered on appeal, under

fundamental error or otherwise, he failed to provide any viable support for his claim that
while he was completing his prison term on his Florida sentences from March 2, 2011,
to March 22, 2011, such incarceration was also for the offenses for which the Idaho
judgments were entered. l.C. § 18-309.

9

In order to prevail on his credit for time served under fundamental error, Kesling must
satisfy the three-part test articulated by the Idaho Supreme Court in Perry:
(1) the defendanf must demonstrate that one or more of the defendant's
unwaived constitutional rights were violated, (2) the error must be clear or
obvious, without the need for any additional information not contained in
the appellate record, including information as to whether the failure to
object was a tactical decision; and (3) the defendant must demonstrate
that the error affected the defendant's substantial rights meaning (in most
instances) that it must have affected the outcome of the trial proceedings.
150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d 978.

12

Kesling correctly points out that, under l.C. § 19-2603, 1° credit for time served
"shall accrue after the service of a bench warrant," and that an agent's warrant may
serve as the "functional equivalent" of a bench warrant.

(Appellant's Brief, pp.16-17

(emphasis added)); see State v. Covert, 143 Idaho 169, 171, 139 P.3d 771, 773 (Ct.
App. 2006)

Kesling contends that the "DETAIN" entry placed on his Florida Inmate

Record on March 2, 2011, was a "detainer warranf' which, in turn, was the functional
equivalent of a bench warrant. 11 (Appellant's Brief, p.17 ("Here, like the facts in Covert,
the detainer warrant was the functional equivalent of a bench warrant, as Mr. Kesling's
freedom was affected.").)
However, Kesling's assertions are more than can be known based on the record
developed in the district court and provided to this Court. Kesling failed to present the
district court with any evidence explaining what type of document(s), if any, were sent
by Idaho to the Florida Department of Corrections that caused the latter to change the
10

l.C. § 19-2603 states:
When the defendant is brought before the court in such case, it
may, if judgment has been withheld, pronounce any judgment which it
could originally have pronounced, or, if judgment was originally
pronounced but suspended, the original judgment shall be in full force and
effect and may be executed according to law, and the time such person
shall have been at large under such suspended sentence shall not be
counted as a part of the term of his sentence, but the time of the
defendant's sentence shall count from the date of service of such bench
warrant.

11

Without any supporting authority, Kesling assumes that when Florida changed the
entry on his prison record from "NOTIFY" to "DETAIN," he was placed in the custody of
the Idaho Department of Correction. However, it is much more reasonable to conclude
that the entries on Kesling's Florida prison record signify, in advance, what Florida was
supposed to do with Kesling after he completed his Florida sentences.

13

entry on Kesling's Florida Inmate Record from "NOTIFY" to "DETAIN" on March 2,
2011. (See generally 12/8/11 Tr.) Therefore, it would have been impossible (even if
asked) for the district court to have made the determinations Kesling appears to regard
as facts - i.e., that the "DETAIN" entry on March 2, 2011, was caused by Florida's
receipt of a "detainer warrant" which was the "functional equivalent" of a bench warrant.
Without any evidence explaining what legal hold, if any, Idaho may have placed on
Kesling on March 2, 2011, Kesling's argument is baseless. Moreover, as required by
l.C. § 19-2603, Kesling has not shown, or even alleged, that he was served with the
"functional equivalent" of an Idaho bench warrant on March 2, 2011.
In sum, Kesling failed to develop any evidentiary basis in the district court to
support his argument that he is entitled to credit for time served during the last 20 days
he was serving his Florida sentences. As a result, the appellate record provides no
basis for this Court to find, pursuant to l.C. § 18-309, that Kesling was being held by
Idaho during those 20 days by a functional equivalent to a bench warrant from Idaho,
i.e., that such incarceration was for the offenses for which the Idaho judgments were
entered. Kesling has failed to show that the district court erred, much less committed
fundamental error, in not granting him credit for time served in a Florida prison from
March 2, 2011, to March 22, 2011.

14

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that the district court's order revoking Kesling's
probation in Idaho Supreme Court No. 39486 be vacated, and that the district court's
orders denying Kesling's requests for additional credit for time served in Idaho Supreme
Court Case Nos. 39484 and 39485 be affirmed.
DATED this 1yth day of June, 2013.

'
C. McKINNE
uty Attorney Ge
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 1th day of June, 2013, served a true and
correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a copy addressed
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SALLY J. COOLEY
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the Idaho
Supreme Court Clerk's office.

. McKinney
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